RE: [Asrg] Problems that make the RMX proposal infeasible

-----Original Message-----
>From: Postmaster [mailto:Postmaster@bellsouth.com] 
>Subject: [Asrg] Problems that make the RMX proposal infeasible
>
>--- Why can't the record just contain the IP range "owned" by the
domains
>authorized mail servers?

>I realize the a spammer can use a valid domain with a valid RMX and
this
>would not cause a rejection, but at this point I can either put
pressure on
>the ISP of that domain and/or block the IP altogether.
The point is that you _CAN'T_ put the pressure on anyone, since the RMX
authenticator is spoofed.

You can blacklist the IP, but that is no better than the status quo.

> In either case, I now don't have to worry about someone claiming to be
from
>Yahoo and actually from a Chinese relay server.
> I am not adverse to a "solve-all" solution, but I truly don't think it
>exists and if it does, it would be just too radical to implement all at
>once.
Provided that you've done a recent lookup on yahoo.com and it is still
in your cache.  BTW, yahoo.com has a TTL of 600 seconds.  

What is it that you think RMX is buying you?

> I think that RMX and pure ISP administrative changes like credit card
>flags, closing port 25, and billing commercial mailers would put a huge
dent
>in the amount of spam received.

> What would be required to make it work?
>In a perfect world where everything worked as it is supposed to... How
would
>this be implemented?
If we could eliminate all people who do bad things, then any protocol
will
work just fine.  Since this is not possible today, so we have to use
protocols
that are resistant to attack.  Why waste effort implementing a system
that
is fundamentally flawed?

		Jonathan

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