Re: national security

Paul Vixie <vixie@vix.com> Sun, 30 November 2003 19:12 UTC

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To: ietf@ietf.org
Subject: Re: national security
References: <6.0.0.22.2.20031127212644.049baec0@mail.utel.net>
From: Paul Vixie <vixie@vix.com>
Date: Sun, 30 Nov 2003 18:47:10 +0000
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i'm going to bend my own policy a bit and reply to a role account:

info@utel.net (jfcm) writes:

> ...  The interest is not sites nor network protection layers, but nations
> protection from what happens on or with the networks. This is in line
> with the White House document http://whitehouse.gov/pcipb with the
> addition of the risks created by the US (and every other national) cyber
> security effort, and from not mastering the root. In most of the cases
> the identified risks come from a centralized [root] which has to be made
> distributed.

this statement is akin to many others made in ignorance of what dns is.  you
are treating it as a mapping service.  perhaps you have been successful at
treating dns as a mapping service in some local context, and this may have
led you to the impossible conclusion that dns itself is a mapping service.

dns is a coherent, distributed, autonomous, reliable database.  "distributing
the root" as you claim to believe is necessary would create multiple domain
name systems, not *a* domain name system with a distributed root.  there is no
way to have *a* domain name system with a distributed root unless we (ietf
or other similar agencies) first defined what that meant.  when you're ready
to commission a multiyear study which would yield documents of the same size
and scope as rfcs 1033+1034+1035+2181, then you'll have demonstrated that
you have some understanding of what you're asking for here.  and note that
you would then have to "sell" the resulting system to the internet populance
which includes end users, domain holders, registrars, registries, ISPs, and
as you point out, nations.  lots of luck, but "that ship already sailed."

in no particular order, i'll address a couple of your other comments.

> 5. the possibility of a redundant DNS system. Today the Internet has two 
> root files (the same file but presented on two main systems - DNS and FTP). 
> If one is hacked there is not reference. A redundant system would consist 
> in two or more root masters refereeing to different sets of TLD name 
> servers (all of them carrying the same files, but possibly of different 
> origins for security reasons).

there is a reference.  several references, actually.  there is no possibility
of a "hack" going undetected or uncorrected.  but more important, if you had
several "root files" which indicated different servers for some TLD's, you
would have (by definition) several domain name systems, not a domain name
system with high redundancy.  until you demonstrate some understanding of
that fundamental and definitional aspect of dns, you won't be taken seriously
among the community who does understand those things.

> Thank you for your comments.
> jfc

please learn the basics before you come in here and start making proposals.
-- 
Paul Vixie